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1Accumulation, Productivity and
Technology: Measurement and Analysis
of Long Term Economic Growth
By Bart van Ark
Groningen Growth and Development Centre
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
This paper provides a brief overview of the “state of the art” on research on the sources of long term
economic growth. It is argued that, despite the enormous progress in development of the theory and
empirics on long term economic growth, we are still not able to unambiguously distinguish between the
determinants of growth. The distinction between accumulation, productivity and technology is a useful
device to structure the debate, as the former two tend to emphasize the importance of investment and
increased efficiency in use of resources, whereas the latter puts the contribution of invention and innovation
change into the spotlight. However, the most powerful explanations of economic growth are those which
combine these various aspects of growth with an explicit focus on historical, institutional and political
factors in the growth process. To strengthen empirical research, the paper recommends greater attention for
reconstruction of historical national accounts, the development of a broad range of technology indicators
1. Introduction
During the past two centuries the world economy has experienced unprecedented growth.
Between 1820 and 1997, World Gross Domestic Product in constant prices has increased
at about 2.2 % per year on average, which is between six and seven times the world
growth rate during the preceding period, 1500 to 1820 (Maddison, 1995). However, the
fortunes of growth have been distributed unequally over time as well over space. Almost
everywhere in the world, growth rates have accelerated since 1870 and once again since
1950. Since the mid 1970s growth of the world economy has slowed down, even though
the overall growth rate is still considerably higher than before 1950. Whereas the growth
acceleration between 1870 and 1973 has been pretty much world wide, people have
benefited from it to different degrees given the large differences in population growth
rates. Hence in terms of income per head of the population, Northwest Europe, North
America and Japan have shown much faster growth than the rest of the world between
21820 and 1992. Today’s developing world has also known phases of rapid growth, but at
different times and different places. For example, GDP per capita in Latin America
improved relatively rapidly during the first half of the twentieth century, whereas
Southern Europe and East and Southeast Asia have experienced high growth rates relative
to the rest of the world since 1950.
A main issue for historical research in economic growth is to understand what
explains this diversity in long run economic growth. What has caused the acceleration of
growth since 1870, the extraordinary rapid growth between 1950 and 1973, and the
slowdown since 1973? Why has the population in Europe, Japan and North America
benefited most strongly from the “golden era” between 1950 to 1973? Why have all
regions except East Asia faced a substantial slowdown in growth since 1973? To what
extent has the acceleration of output growth arisen from putting more resources into the
production process (accumulation), from a more efficient use of those resources
(productivity), or from better technology? Do we have the theoretical and empirical
understanding to unambiguously distinguish between these sources of growth? And how
important is the broader historical, institutional and political context in which the sources
of growth are analyzed?
This paper gives a brief overview of the “state of the art” of research on the sources
of economic growth. Section 2 reviews the various theoretical and conceptual approaches
which have been employed to disentangle the sources of growth.1 Section 3 discusses the
major empirical sources required for the study of long-run economic growth, and in
particular reviews the reconstruction of historical national accounts.2 Section 4 reports
results from recent work on assessing the sources of growth of advanced economies.3
Section 5 concludes with recommendations for the future research agenda in this field.
32. Analytical Approaches to Economic Growth
To disentangle the sources of economic growth one requires an analytical framework to
assess the contribution of various factors to growth. This involves the formulation of
theories, models and hypotheses on the role of accumulation, productivity and
technology. Over the past decades this has been mainly the domain of economists and
economic historians, but as yet there is no consensus on what emphasis should be given
to the key factors behind growth and how these are linked.
Accumulation concentrates on the role of investment and the effect of investment
on the stock of physical, human and natural resources. It is strongly represented by Post-
Keynesian growth theories, which started with Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946), but
became more advanced with Kaldor (1957) and more recently Scott (1989). The
traditional neoclassical approach also starts from the accumulist perspective by relying on
a production function framework (Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956).
However, in the empirical work on sources of growth, referred to as “growth
accounting”, the contribution of productivity became visible. Tinbergen (1942),
Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) defined output as a function of labour and capital,
weighted at their respective factor shares in value added. Then they identified a “residual”
which accounts for the difference in the growth of output and the contribution of the
inputs. This residual has been named “total factor productivity” (or the “Solow residual”)
and has often, in particular by economists, been equated with technical progress.
According to these early growth accounting studies, total factor productivity growth
contributed very substantially to economic growth. For example, Solow (1957) reported
that 52 per cent of US output growth between 1909 and 1949 was due to TFP growth.
Kendrick (1961, 1976) has contributed to the growth accounting tradition by augmenting
factor inputs with the quality of labour (distinguished by levels of education, and age- and
sex- composition) and capital (distinguished by vintage effects).
In the growth literature of the 1960s a discussion emerged on the extent to which
technical progress was, at least partly, embodied in the factor inputs (Solow, 1960). Salter
(1960) clearly argues the case that capital accumulation is the main vehicle of technical
4progress, and he introduced the vintage approach to capital accumulation. However,
Salter argues that a clear distinction between technical progress and economies needs to
made and that the latter contributed significantly more to growth than the former.
Jorgenson made a clear distinction between investment and productivity.4 He applied a
rigorous criterion, namely that investments concern commitment of current resources in
the expectation of future returns, which implies that the returns can be internalized by the
investor. In contrast, productivity relates to incomes that are generated external to the
economic activities undertaken by the investor. Hence productivity is associated with
spillovers and externalities that cannot be appropriated. The effects of substitution
between labour and capital or between different types of capital is therefore part of the
investment process, leaving less room for productivity growth as a contributing factor to
growth than in the more aggregate growth accounting approaches.
Another strand in the growth accounting tradition focussed in more detail on the
opening up of the “black box”, i.e. the residual, that remains after allowing for the
contribution of the quantity and quality of labour, capital and land to growth. The work by
Denison (1962, 1967, 1974, 1979) has been of fundamental importance in understanding
the role of economies of scale, allocation of resources, advances in knowledge, and the
effects of irregularities in demand. Maddison (1972, 1982, 1991, 1996) has continued to
expand international comparisons of growth accounting by quantifying the contributions
of augmented inputs, foreign trade effects, catch-up effects, structural effects and
economies of scale to output growth. Maddison identified these factors as typical
“proximate” sources of growth as they contribute directly to changes in output growth.
However, Maddison also emphasized the importance of “ultimate” sources of growth
which are related to the political-institutional environment, and he stressed the
importance of historical events. Hence this growth accounting strand can be linked to the
historical approaches to economic growth, which will be discussed later. 5
Traditional growth accounting measures assume that a fixed combination of
inputs increases proportionally with output (i.e. it assumes constant returns), so that the
residual output growth can be allocated to a more efficient use of inputs. The recent “new
growth” literature has argued that the possibility of increasing returns needs to be
5reflected in the underlying production function. Increasing returns may either arise from
physical capital (Romer, 1986, 1987), from human capital (Lucas, 1988) or from the
creation of new ideas and knowledge (Romer, 1990, 1994). Many of these ideas were not
really new as these were identified and measured by the earlier generations of growth
theorists and growth accountants.6 The novelty, however, lies in the attempts to model
and test these ideas on the basis of econometric specifications and by giving a greater role
to the firm which creates new knowledge in an environment of imperfect competition.
The testing of new growth models requires cross-section regression analysis as the
coefficients on the variables cannot be assumed beforehand as in the case of the constant
return models.7 Empirical studies of increasing returns on physical capital have rejected
the hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). In the
case of human capital, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) has argued that a constant-
returns Solow-model augmented with human capital included as a separate input greatly
strengthens the explanatory power of the model. The most convincing approach to
increasing returns comes from models on ideas and knowledge. In these models the
spillover from returns on R&D, or from inventions and innovations, are seen as the main
engine of growth. Recently this approach has been refined by Aghion and Howitt (1998).
It should be emphasized that the “new growth” approaches have opened up new
avenues to model the role of technological change in economic growth, as the
Schumpeterian concept of  “creative destruction” at firm level is an essential part of
knowledge models. However, the historical and empirical evidence for these models still
needs to be further developed.8 Crafts (1997) emphasizes that much of the research by
economic historians on technological change and by other researchers on technology
economics has largely gone unnoticed by growth economists.
A number of alternative approaches to growth puts technological change more
explicitly in the spotlight. These approaches see investment in human and physical capital
as a necessary but insufficient factor to achieve growth. They emphasize that countries
require enterpreneurship, innovation and learning before they can employ new
technologies to achieve growth.  The technology  approaches to growth are of a more
hybrid nature than the accumulation and productivity approaches, but most studies have
6strong “Schumpeterian” characteristics as they give an explicit role to firms, to
organizational change, management, marketing and finance and to the discontinuous
nature of technological change (e.g. Schumpeter, 1943). Firstly, a range of studies
recognized that the assumptions of rational optimization and perfect foresight, which are
characteristic of the neoclassical approach, are not adequate in explaining the process of
technological change. The evolutionary approach to economic growth therefore analyzes
strategies to optimize profit (not maximize) profits under assumptions of bounded
rationality. These theories much emphasis on the uncertainties of the search process and
the importance of “routines” in these searches (Nelson and Winter, 1982). A major
problem of the these microeconomic evolutionary models is that they cannot be solved
analytically, but require computer simulation. A calibration of the Nelson and Winter-
model of the time series on US sources of growth from 1909-1949 suggest results which
are broadly in line with Solow’s growth accounting results for 1957.9
A second group of studies in the Schumpeterian tradition has a more historical
flavour to it. It focuses on the importance of historical factors which determine the role of
institutions in the process of technological change. For example, Von Tunzelmann (1995)
analyzes how the organization of science and technology, together with organization of
finance, production, etc., form a “National System of Production”, which differs over
time and across space. A particularly important aspect of the historical approach are the
concepts of “path-dependency” and “technological  lock ins”. These explain the economic
supremacy of certain nations and regions at different points in time. For example, the
advance of the United States as the world economic leader in terms of labour productivity
at the end of the 19th century, is strongly related to a greater reliance on mass production
strategies in combination with a rapid increase in capital intensity due to shortages of
skilled labour and large economies of scale (Broadberry, 1997). Similarly the rapid
growth of the East Asian economies since the 1960s can be related to a combination of
large opportunities for catch-up in combination with rapid investment in human and
physical capital, the opening up of economies for foreign trade and foreign direct
investment, and effective government policies accompanying this process of
accumulation, productivity and technological progress (World Bank, 1993). The main
7message of the historical studies therefore is the greater emphasis on the role of historical,
institutional and political factors influencing the growth process.
3. National Accounts and the Analysis of Long Term Economic Growth
To test the theories, models and hypotheses on the sources of economic growth, one
requires detailed empirical information on output and inputs, including the quantities and
quality of land, labour, physical capital and human capital, and technology inputs.
National accounts are a good starting point to obtain such information, as they provide a
comprehensive accounting framework for output, expenditure and income. It constitutes
an important improvement over the alternative of having to use scattered primary statis-
tics, such as population and production censuses, during pre-national accounts era.
Although the concept of national accounting goes back to the works of Sir William Petty
and Gregory King in the late seventeenth century, the construction of national accounts
according to internationally agreed accounting standards dates back no more than half a
century.
The past few decades have been characterised by a great deal of activity in constructing
and reconstructing of historical national accounts for many countries. Some national
statistical offices have undertaken (part of) the backward reconstruction of the national
accounts for the post World War-II period, but for the pre-World War II period the major
contributions in this area have come from individual academic scholars in many countries.
The first generation of historical national accounts which emerged during the
early post-1945 period concerned only a small number of advanced countries, including
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Later
more industrialized countries got their historical national accounts, such as Japan, Finland
and Spain. Belgium and the Netherlands are also well underway in completing historical
national accounts in their first generation, and major studies for China and India are being
undertaken. The national accounts of some countries, including Canada, Denmark, the
UK, Sweden and the USA even went into their second, third of even fourth generations.
But there is still a large group of countries outside the core of the industrialized world for
8which information is scattered and which lack comprehensive long-term national
accounts.10
The international comparability of historical national accounts still leaves much to
be desired for. Unlike present-day national accounts, at the time of the origin of the
earlier accounts, there was no commonly accepted framework such as the post-war
System of National Accounts (SNA). This has created substantial problems in the recon-
struction efforts, though most scholars have adhered (more or less strictly) to the post-war
SNA conventions. Some scholars have done a great deal to place historical national ac-
counts into an international comparative perspective. For the post-1950 period, the Penn
World Tables are an extensively used source on national accounts and related information
for some 130 countries, whereas for a longer time span back to 1820 the work of Angus
Maddison features most prominently.11
Even though historical national accounts greatly differ in quality, detail and
sophistication, a number of general remarks can be made about the main issues of
concern for international comparison of long run economic growth:
1) Weighting procedures. One of the main purposes of national accounts is to provide an
accurate picture of the changes in real GDP and its components over time. Such
changes in volume terms need necessarily be related to a benchmark year with a given
basket of goods and services. The weights for the benchmark year are assumed
representative for the volume index or the price index (which was used to deflate the
output value in current prices) over any length of time. As it has mostly not been
possible for historical national accountants to obtain information on weights for all
years, one usually had to rely on a few or, in the worst case, only one benchmark year.
The most appropriate approach is the use of regular shifts in benchmark years every
five or ten years, and some coordination among various countries would highly
increase comparability.12
2) The estimation of intermediate inputs, capital and labour. An important ingredient of
any empirical study of economic growth, is the estimation of intermediate inputs and
factor inputs. With the exception of manufacturing, there is very little comprehensive
evidence on intermediate inputs in the production process before the era of input-
9output tables. Historical sources on capital stock and capital services are only
available for a very limited number of advanced countries.13 Historical labour
statistics are more widely available, but the consistency with the national accounts is
still weak in many cases. Finally, the estimation of technology indicators is still
insufficiently developed (Griliches, 1994).
3) The treatment of services. Much of the work on historical national accounts has
focused primarily on the commodity sectors of the economy. The measurement of real
output in services is not as sophisticated even though the procedures are not much
different from what they mostly still are today. Historical national accounts often
assume no productivity change in services and rely largely on changes in the wage bill
in services. On the whole real output growth in services is likely to be understated in
most accounts, because the "no productivity growth"-assumption seems quite unrealistic
even for non-market services. In some cases, in particular for goods-related services,
quantity indicators were used or it has been assumed that real output growth in these
services moved parallel to commodity production. Another problem associated with
services concerns the boundaries of the economic activity domain. For example, as
household production is kept outside the boundaries of the national accounts, the growth
of output in current prices in the long run is partly affected by the shift of many
activities from households to the monetised sector of the economy.
4. Major Empirical Evidence and Controversies
What have we learned on the sources of economic growth over the past century? It goes
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete overview. However, some evidence
from the most recent work might illustrate the present “state of the art” and the major
controversies.
Table 1 presents growth accounting estimates for six advanced economies from
Maddison (1991, 1996). Maddison’s estimates are very well documented, and, for
example, his procedures to obtain capital stock using a perpetual inventory method by
accumulating investment and discarding assets according to standardised assumptions on
10
asset lives, are fully transparent and can be reconstructed.14 Maddison’s estimates suggest
that more than two thirds of real GDP growth since 1913 can be explained, with the
notable exceptions of France and the UK from 1913-1950.
The Maddison-estimates span a relatively long period which makes his work
unique.15 For the period since World War II there are two important extensions in growth
accounting. The first concerns the greater detail on input structures, which is most clearly
represented in the work of Jorgenson and associates. Table 2 compares the contribution of
“productivity” to GDP growth according to Maddison’s and Jorgenson’s estimates. Even
though the periodisation of the two studies is somewhat different, it emerges that, with
the exception of Japan (1950-73) and US (1973-1995), Jorgenson assigns a larger part of
growth to investment than Maddison. This in particular due to the greater share of
substitution between different types of labour and capital in Jorgenson’s investment
concept.
The second extension in growth accounting concerns the disaggregation of the
estimates to sectors of the economy. Table 3 presents sectoral growth accounts for
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the USA for 1973-1995 updated from Van Ark
(1996). The estimates assign a large role to the rise in capital intensity in explaining
labour productivity growth for France, Germany and the Netherlands relative to the
United States. However, despite the greater capital intensity, TFP growth in these
European countries was also faster than in the United States, in particular in
manufacturing. Even in services capital intensity growth was faster in Europe than in the
USA, but with the exception of Germany, European TFP growth in services was not
faster than in the USA. If TFP is assumed to proxy efficiency and innovation, the
conclusion might be that the rapid capital accumulation process in European
manufacturing has also led to greater efficiency and more technological change during the
past two decades. However, in services both Europe and the USA suffer from low
efficiency and a lack of technological progress.
As discussed in section 2, approaches to economic growth which model
increasing returns to scale require testing on the basis of cross-section regression analysis
or data panel techniques. Table 4 represents results of a regression analysis, derived from
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Van Ark and Crafts (1996) using the formulation of Levine and Renelt (1992), to identify
the factors contribution to “average” European growth of GDP per capita. The underlying
equation finds a positive relation with investment and education variables and a negative
relationship with the share of government consumption in GDP and with initial income
per capita. The latter effect represents a catch-up effect, and can be compared with one of
Maddison’s four additional explanatory variables (see Table 1). Maddison (1996) defined
the catch-up effect as 20% of the productivity growth bonus of each country over the
USA. On average, for the four European countries in his growth accounts (France,
Germany, Netherlands and UK),  Maddison finds a slowdown of –0.13 %-point in the
catch-up effect after 1973 relative to the 1950-73 period. This is considerably less than
the –1.06 %-point according to the Levine and Renelt specification. Indeed both
Maddison’s and Jorgenson’s results ascribe a much bigger part of the growth slowdown
since 1973 to the actual decline in productivity rather than to the exhaustion of the catch-
up effect per se.  However, the regression results must be regarded at best as illustrative
on the sources of growth because this accounting method can be quite sensitive to the
specification of the variables and the countries included in the regression. For example, as
Table 4 shows the regression results considerably understate the acceleration of growth
during the 1950-73 period compared to the 1929-1938 period. So far all comparisons
have been in terms of growth rates, but for a complete assessment of economic
performance one needs to take account of the relative levels of economic performance as
well. Measures of GDP per capita expressed in a common currency, like US dollars, or
levels of labour productivity relative to the USA are an essential ingredient of studies of
convergence and divergence. These measures can be constructed from comparison of
income based on purchasing power parities as regularly constructed by the International
Comparisons Programme of Eurostat, OECD, the United Nations and the World Bank.
For the study of long run economic growth, comparisons of labour productivity by
sector and industry is a useful complementary analytical tool. Measures of relative levels
of industry productivity were pioneered in studies by Rostas (1948) and Paige and
Bombach (1958). The ICOP (International Comparisons of Output and Productivity)
programme at the University of Groningen has developed a large range of contemporary
12
studies for manufacturing and other sectors of the economy, complemented with
historical studies of benchmark year estimates for the first part of the century.16 Recently,
Broadberry (1997) assembled the information from historical benchmark studies of
manufacturing productivity levels, which were linked with time series of manufacturing
productivity growth (Table 5). Strikingly Broadberry’s estimates for manufacturing
suggest a very different pattern of long term convergence in manufacturing than has been
observed for the economy as a whole. Instead of a general process of productivity-catch
up in advanced countries to the US level, the manufacturing estimates suggest a pattern of
local convergence. For example, productivity levels in the North European countries
seem to have fluctuated around a fairly similar level since 1870, but have not caught up
much relative to the USA except for the period 1950-1973. Broadberry explains the
stability in comparative manufacturing productivity levels from differences in
technological regimes, and the strong impact of path-dependency on changes in these
regimes.
A major problem of the accounting approaches described above is that they all fail
to give a precise estimate of the contribution of technological change to growth. This has
led to major controversies in the literature on the contribution of technological progress to
growth, of which the discussion on the Solow “productivity paradox” is only the most
recent.17 To measure the effects of technological change on growth, the impact of
increases in expenditure on research and development or patents on growth is obtained
from regression analysis. Table 6 shows estimates from Verspagen (1996), which
establish the %-point contribution of the increase in the stock of patents on labour
productivity growth between 1950 and 1988. The estimates suggest that in Europe
technological progress contributed between 8 and 13 percent to productivity growth,
which is much less than in Japan where the growth contribution accounted for between 15
and 30 percent but more than in the USA where the technology contribution to growth
was virtually zero.
This “macro”-work on technological progress is now increasingly complemented
with micro-indicators which are obtained from innovation surveys and production
censuses and surveys. Micro-based technology indicators, such as those presently
13
constructed in the framework of the Community Innovation Survey, identify a broader
range of technological activities than what is measured by either patents or R&D. In
combination with recent micro-work on productivity, job flows and innovation from
longitudinal data bases from production censuses and surveys, empirical research in these
areas may open up new avenues for research on linking productivity and technology.18
5. Conclusion and Areas for Further Research
This paper argues that, despite the enormous progress in development of the theory and
empirics on economic growth, we are still not able to unambiguously distinguish between
the determinants of growth. The distinction between accumulation, productivity and
technology is a useful device to structure the debate, as the former two tend to emphasize
the importance of investment whereas the latter puts invention and innovation change into
the spotlight. However, the most powerful explanations of economic growth are those
which combine these aspects of growth, and in particular give a role to historical,
institutional and political factors in the growth process.
Apart from the need for more theoretical work on the link between investment,
productivity  and technological progress, further empirical work on data construction is
required as well. Firstly the construction of comprehensive long-term national accounts
needs to be refined and extended to other countries. In particular the use of weighting
systems, the construction of input-output tables and labour and capital accounts, as well
as coordination on techniques to estimate real output in services deserve attention.
However, even in the most recent System of National Accounts (1993) there are
important gaps in solving these problems. For example, even though SNA 1993 includes
an extensive chapter on production accounts, it still lacks the description of an
intermediate inputs account in constant prices. A labour account, which provides
estimates of labour input in current and constant prices is part of SNA 1993, but has only
been implied for a small number of countries. A capital account, for which the idea was
implemented by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), is still entirely lacking.
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Secondly, the development of indicators measuring technological change needs to
go beyond the measurement of R&D and patents. These measures are increasingly
unsatisfactory, in particular since an increasingly large part of the economy consists of
services. Micro-surveys on innovation, such as the Community Innovation Survey, and
longitudinal data bases underlying the production censuses and surveys are of great help
in this respect.
Thirdly, comparisons of relative levels of economic performance are an important
ingredient for understanding the link between investment, productivity and technological
change. For example, the catch-up potential of a country in combination with its technical
and social capabilities to realize this potential determine the possibility to benefit from
technology diffusion (Abramovitz, 1991). Comparisons of relative level of performance,
require the use of purchasing power parities or related measures to convert output to a
common currency. Recently, the ICP PPP programme has been criticized in a number of
reports for lack of methodological coherency and shortage of funding.19 If these
developments are not reversed, this puts an important aspect in  understanding the link
between growth and technological process in jeopardy, in particular for low-income
countries.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the analysis of economic growth requires a
broader perspective that does not pay exclusively attention to the “proximate sources”
which can be relatively easily quantified and linked to output growth. In addition, a focus
on the underlying “ultimate sources” of growth, including the institutional, political and
historical environment in which economies function, is needed.
15
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Table 1 – Percentage Point Contribution of Sources of Growth to Growth of Real GDP,
1913-1992, Based on Growth Accounts of Maddison (1991, 1995 and 1996)
France West Germany Netherlands
1913-50 1950-73 1973-92 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92
GDP 1.15 5.02 2.26 1.28 5.99 2.30 2.43 4.74 2.14
Labour Inputs -0.53 0.01 -0.32 0.17 0.32 c -0.27 0.77 -0.05 -0.05
Human Capital 0.36 0.36 0.69 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.27 0.43 0.57
Non-residental Capital 0.36 1.44 1.30 0.32 1.89 1.01 0.73 1.37 0.88
Capital Quality (a) n.a. 0.15 -0.04 n.a. 0.31 -0.08 n.a. 0.13 -0.06
Total Augmented Factor Inputs 0.20 1.96 1.63 0.70 2.71 0.78 1.77 1.88 1.34
Other Explanatory Items (b) 0.10 1.34 0.65 0.11 1.64 0.70 0.22 1.80 0.50
Explained Growth (%) 26 66 101 63 73 64 82 78 86
Unexplained Growth (%) 74 34 -1 37 27 36 18 22 14
United Kingdom Japan United States
1913-50 1950-73 1973-92 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92
GDP 1.19 2.96 1.59 2.24 9.25 3.76 2.84 3.91 2.39
Labour Inputs -0.32 -0.11 -0.40 0.28 1.89 d 0.32 0.25 0.81 0.86
Human Capital 0.21 0.13 0.42 0.62 0.52 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.43
Non-residental Capital 0.33 1.55 0.99 1.25 2.76 2.04 0.60 0.98 0.94
Capital Quality (a) n.a. 0.09 -0.06 n.a. 0.30 -0.07 n.a. 0.07 -0.04
Total Augmented Factor Inputs 0.21 1.66 0.95 2.15 5.47 2.75 1.26 2.34 2.19
Other Explanatory Items (b) 0.01 0.59 0.31 -0.05 3.01 0.79 0.41 0.33 -0.05
Explained Growth (%) 19 76 79 94 92 94 59 68 90
Unexplained Growth (%) 81 24 21 6 8 6 41 32 10
Note: 1913-50 are printed in italics because the estimates are not strictly comparable with those for 1950-73 and 1973-92. For
France, Germany and The Netherlands the capital stock estimates for these three countries are not based on the "standardized
perpetual inventory capital stock estimates as described in Maddison (1995a). Moreover there is no capital quality effect and
catch-up effect calculated for any of the countries for the period 1913-50.
(a) Includes adjustment for age effect and, in case of Germany and Japan for 1950-73, a capacity reactivation effect
(b) For 1913-50: foreign trade effect, structural effect and economies of scale; for 1950-73 and 1973-92 also incluing a "catch-
up effect"
(c) Includes adjustment for labour dishoarding of 0.32 percentage points
(d) Includes adjustment for labour dishoarding of 0.88 percentage points
Source: 1950-73 and 1973-92 derived from Maddison (1996); 1913-50: for France, Germany and the Netherlands derived
from Maddison (1991); 1913-50 for Japan, UK and USA from Maddison (1995)
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Table 2 – Comparison of Percentage Point Contribution of Investment
And Productivity to GDP Growth, Based on Growth Accounts of
Maddison (1996) and Jorgenson (1999)
Maddison Jorgenson Maddison Jorgenson
1950-73 1960-73 1973-92 1973-95
France
 GDP Growth 5.02 5.32 2.26 2.25
 - Contribution of Investment 1.96 3.19 1.63 1.41
 - Contribution of TFP 3.06 2.13 0.63 0.83
Germany
 GDP Growth 5.99 4.63 2.30 2.37
 - Contribution of Investment 2.71 2.11 0.78 1.74
 - Contribution of TFP 3.28 2.52 1.52 0.63
United Kingdom
 GDP Growth 2.96 3.30 1.59 1.57
 - Contribution of Investment 1.66 1.53 0.95 1.47
 - Contribution of TFP 1.30 1.77 0.64 0.10
Japan
 GDP Growth 9.25 9.98 3.76 3.14
 - Contribution of Investment 5.47 3.56 2.75 2.68
 - Contribution of TFP 3.78 6.42 1.01 0.45
United States
 GDP Growth 3.91 4.16 2.39 2.65
 - Contribution of Investment 2.34 2.78 2.19 2.24
 - Contribution of TFP 1.57 1.38 0.20 0.41
Note: "Investment" is contribution of augmented factor inputs. "TFP" is total
factor productivity and equals growth of GDP minus factor inputs
Source: Maddison (1996) (see also Table 1); Jorgenson and Yip (1999)
21
Table 3 –  Labour productivity, Capital Intensity and Total Factor Productivity by
Major Sector of the Economy, 1973-1995
Whole Agricul- Industry Services
Economy ture Total of which: Total of which:
Manufac- Producer & Personal &
turing Distributive Government
Services (a) Services (b)
France
  GDP/hour 2.7 6.2 3.5 3.5 1.8 2.1 1.5
  Capital Stock/hour 4.2 6.3 4.6 4.9 3.8
  Total Factor Productivity 1.5 4.6 1.9 2.0 0.5
Germany (c)
  GDP/hour 2.7 5.9 2.5 2.8 2.4 3.2 1.8
  Capital Stock/hour 3.7 4.9 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.3 2.8
  Total Factor Productivity 1.6 4.7 1.9 2.3 1.3 1.6 1.1
The Netherlands
  GDP/hour 1.9 5.3 2.6 3.2 1.4 2.1 0.4
  Capital Stock/hour 2.3 5.1 3.0 3.4 1.7
  Total Factor Productivity 1.3 3.5 -0.4 2.3 -0.2
United States
  GDP/hour 1.0 3.4 1.6 2.4 0.9 1.5 0.2
  Capital Stock/hour 0.4 -1.7 1.0 2.0 0.4 2.2 -1.4
  Total Factor Productivity 0.6 2.9 1.0 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.6
(a) Retail and Wholesale Trade, Transport and Communication, Finance, Insurance and Business Services
(b) Personal and Community Services and Government Services
(c) Business Services included with Personal and Community services
Note: Capital stock (1973-1989) is derived with perpetural inventory method, using standardized asset life
assumptions. For France, Germany and USA updated with trend in official capital stock estimates from 1989
onwards. Total factor productivity on the basis of Cobb-Douglas production function. For France, Germany and
USA with constant 1975 shares; for Netherlands with annually changing factor weights.
Source: France, Germany and USA from Van Ark (1996), updated to 1996. Capital stock 1973-1989 from
O’Mahony (1996), updated with trend from official capital stock estimates. Netherlands from Van Ark and de
Haan (1998)
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Table 4 – Regression Estimates of GDP Per Head, 1929-1989
Based on Specification by Levine and Renelt (1992)
1929-38 1950-73 1973-89
Growth of GDP per head
  Estimated 2.44 3.54 1.83
  Actual 2.12 3.84 2.14
  Overestimation 0.32 -0.30 -0.31
Regression Results
  Constant 2.01 2.01 2.01
  Initial GDP per capita -2.43 -2.49 -3.55
  Investment/GDP Ratio 1.42 2.22 2.06
  Secondary school enrolment 0.16 0.68 0.79
  Primary school enrolment 1.9 1.99 1.79
  Government consumption/GDP -0.62 -0.87 -1.27
Change in Catch-Up Effect over Previous Period
  According to regression -0.06 -1.06
  According to Maddison (1996) (a) -0.13
(a) period refers to 1973-92.
Note: Estimates concern unweighted averages of European countries
as in Maddison (1991), excluding Belgium and Switzerland.
Specification is according to Levine and Renelt (1992), equation (ii),
with population growth and irrelevant dummies ignored
Source: Van Ark and Crafts (1996)
Table 5 – Labour Productivity Level in Manufacturing Relative to USA, 1870-1989,
Based on Broadberry (1997)
1870 1913 1929 1938 1950 1973 1989
“Northern Europe”
  Denmark 46 51 33 41 53
  Germany 49 56 42 56 37 55 59
  Netherlands 41 61 33 62 72
  Norway 42 44 49 39 48 48
  Sweden 48 38 52 45 60 68
  UK 49 47 40 52 38 47 56
“Southern Europe”
  France 37 33 40 32 53 65
  Italy 28 24 26 26 45 63
Australia 65 41 53 37 40 46
Canada 43 72 68 76 57 71 69
Japan 11 13 22 8 44 81
USA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: comparisons relative to the UK converted to comparisons relative to the USA
Source: Broadberry (1997)
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Table 6 – Contribution of Technological Progress to
Labour Productivity Growth, 1950-1988, Based on
Cross-Country Growth Regressions from Verspagen (1996)
Labour %-Point Contribution of
Productivity Technology Indicator
Growth Rate Patents Patents
(1950-88) long-time (a) short-time (b)
France 3.27 0.30 0.51
Germany 3.65 0.26 0.50
Netherlands 2.73 0.24 0.38
Sweden 2.14 0.25 0.38
United Kingdom 2.21 0.06 0.09
Japan 5.76 0.96 1.68
United States 1.64 0.05 0.06
(a) Stock of patents assuming a lifetime of 15 years




                                                          
1
 For a more detailed overview of theories and concepts, see Van Ark and Crafts (1996).
2
 For a more extensive review on historical national accounts, Van Ark (1995).
3
 For a collection of pioneering and leading papers in the field of empirical research on long run economic
growth, see Van Ark, ed. (1997)
4
 See Jorgenson (1995) for an overview of papers by himself and his associates on productivity.
5
 Harberger (1998) represents yet another approach to growth accounting. He interprets the TFP residual
as “real cost reductions” which, when expressed in money terms, can be made additive. Harberger also
stresses the importance of the multiplicity of sources from which real cost reductions can arise, and
emphasizes the need to look at TFP performance at firm level to understand these sources.
6
 Another “new growth theory” approach to analyzing the sources of growth stems from the Post-
Keynesian tradition, and is best represented by Scott (1989). Scott rejects the possibility to distinguish
between investment and technological change, but also ignores the distinction productivity and
investment, the importance of substitution effects between different types of investment, and the
influence of other factors than investment on growth.
7
 Alternatively, there has been some recent work in growth accounting using panel regressions (Islam,
1995). It has the advantage over cross-section regression that it is less sensitive to the
inclusion/exclusion of variables and countries. However, panel regressions require econometric
specifications on the basis of specified functional forms.
8
 For example, Jones (1995) has challenged knowledge models on the basis of the observation that despite
a tripling of the number of scientists and engineers since the 1950s, productivity growth has not
accelerated accordingly.
9
 Silverberg and Verspagen (1995) describe a number of macroeconomic evolutionary models that can be
solved analytically.
10. For a more complete overview on historical national accounts European countries, including references to
country sources, see Van Ark (1995). For a world-wide overview, see Maddison (1995)
11. See, for example, Summers and Heston (1988, 1991) and Maddison (1995, 1998)
12 From a historical perspective it is undesirable to shift weights in historical national accounts every year,
which is now done in several postwar national accounts (including the Netherlands and France, and
recently, also the United States). It seriously hampers the usefulness of comparisons of real growth rates
over long periods. See, for example, Krantz (1988).
13 See, for example, Maddison (1995a) for historical estimates of capital stock using the perpetual
inventory method for France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. See
O’Mahony (1996) for similar estimates at a sectoral level
14 See, for example, O’Mahony (1996) who applied the standardised method to sectoral estimates of capital
stock. See Albers, Groote and de Jong (1996) for a reconstruction of the capital stock estimates for the
Netherlands using slightly different investment series.
15 Maddison (1995) includes growth accounting estimates for Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States even going back to 1820.
16 For a review of contemporary ICOP studies, see Van Ark (1993, 1996a). For historical ICOP studies, see
Pilat (1994) for Japan/USA in 1937, Fremdling (1991) and Broadberry and Fremdling (1990) for
Germany/UK from the first half of the 20th century, De Jong (1999) for Netherlands/Belgium and
Netherlands/Germany since 1913, and Horlings and Van Ark (1998) for East European countries relative to
West Germany.
17 The Solow “productivity paradox” is best summarized with Solow’s own remark that “You
can see computers everywhere except in the productivity statistics” (Solow, 1987). Griliches
(1994) is a good review of the general problems in linking technological change and
economic growth.
18 For a review of studies on micro-technology indicators, see Kleinknecht (1996). For a review of
longitudinal studies based on censuses and surveys, see Audretsch (1995) and Davis, Haltiwanger and
Schuh (1996).
19 See Castles (1997) and Ryten (1998).
